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The Principles of European Tort Law: The Right Path to
Harmonization?*
ROGER VAN DEN BERGH AND LOUIS VISSCHER**
Abstract: The goal of the Principles of European Tort Law is to serve as a basis for the
enhancement and harmonization of tort law in Europe. This paper takes a critical look at
these Principles from a Law and Economics perspective. The first part of the paper ques-
tions the traditional arguments in favour of harmonization, such as the need to achieve a
‘level playing field’ for industry and the reduction of legal uncertainty which may hinder
cross-border trade. There are several economic arguments in favour of diverging tort laws:
the possibility to satisfy heterogeneous preferences and the learning processes generated
by competition between legal orders. Economic arguments in favour of harmonization are
weak. There is no need for central rules to internalize externalities; a race to the bottom
is unlikely and the amount of transaction cost savings may be low. The second part of the
paper examines whether the Principles may contribute to ‘better’ tort law. Large parts of
the Principles, such as the fault standard and some of the rules on causation, are in
conformity with economic insights. According to Article 10:101, damages serve the goal
of compensation but also the aim of preventing harm. However, it is shown that several
provisions of the Principles are not in conformity with the goal of prevention. The analysis
focuses on the limitation of damages to normal losses, the different levels of protection in
function of the nature of the safeguarded interests, the narrow strict liability rule for harm
caused by abnormally dangerous activities and rules for assessing damages. The
concluding remarks provide an overall assessment of the Principles for the future devel-
opment of tort law in Europe.
Résumé: Le but des Principles of European Tort Law est de servir comme base pour
l’amélioration et l’harmonization du droit de la responsabilité civile. La première partie
de cette contribution examine la nécessité d’une harmonization de la perspective de l’ana-
lyse économique du droit. Les auteurs critiquent les arguments traditionnels en faveur
d’une intervention législative européenne, comme la nécessité d’établir des conditions
égales de concurrence et la réduction de l’insécurité juridique qui empêcherait les trans-
actions entre Etats Membres. Ils soulignent les arguments économiques en faveur des lois
divergentes: la possibilité de satisfaire des préférences hétérogènes et les processus d’ap-
prentissage qui résultent d’une concurrence entre systèmes juridiques. Par contre, les
arguments en faveur d’une harmonization sont faibles. La centralisation n’est pas requise
pour internaliser les externalités entre Etats Membres; le danger d’une race to the bottom
est improbable et les avantages résultant d’une réduction des coûts de transaction ne
semblent pas importants. La seconde partie de la contribution examine si les Principes
peuvent contribuer à un ‘meilleur’ droit de la responsabilité civile. Une grande partie des
Principles, comme l’appréciation de la faute et certains règles concernant la cause, sont
en harmonie avec l’analyse économique. Partant de la définition du concept de dommages
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intérêts (Art. 10:101), qui stipule non seulement le but de la compensation mais aussi
celle de la prévention, les auteurs indiquent plusieurs règles qui ne sont pas conformes
avec le but préventif. Ils discutent la limitation des dommages intérêts aux pertes
normales, les différents degrés de protection en fonction de la nature des intérêts
protégés, la règle très restrictive de responsabilité objective pour des activités anormale-
ment dangereuses et les règles concernant l’estimation des dommages intérêts. Les
remarques conclusives fournissent une appréciation globale des Principles pour le futur
développement du droit de la responsabilité civile en Europe.
Zusammenfassung: Die Principles of European Tort Law haben zum Ziel, einen Beitrag
zu leisten für die qualitative Verbesserung und Harmonisierung des Haftungsrechts in
Europa. Der Aufsatz unterwirft die Principles einer kritischen Analyse von der
Perspektive der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts. Der erste Teil des Aufsatzes formuliert
Einwände gegen die traditionellen Argumente für eine Harmonisierung. Kritisiert
werden das Ziel der Schaffung einheitlicher Konkurrenzbedingungen im Binnenmarkt
(level playing field) und die Reduzierung der Rechtsunsicherheit, die den zwischenstaat-
lichen Handel beeinträchtigen würde. Es gibt wichtige Argumente zugunsten eines
Wettbewerbs zwischen Haftungsregeln: die Möglichkeit zur Befriedigung heterogener
Präferenzen und die Lernprozesse, die durch einen Regulierungswettbewerb ermöglicht
werden. Demgegenüber sind die Argumente für eine Harmonisierung schwach. Zur
Internalisierung externer Effekte ist eine Zentralisierung des Deliktsrecht nicht nötig,
die Gefahr eines race to the bottom ist unwahrscheinlich und der Umfang der
Transaktionskostenersparnisse ist eher niedrig. Der zweite Teil des Aufsatzes untersucht
inwieweit die Principles dazu beitragen können, ein ‚besseres’ Haftungsrecht zu schaffen.
Ein großer Teil der Principles, sowie die Verschuldenshaftung und einzelne Regeln mit
Bezug auf die Ursachlichkeit, ist in Einklang mit der ökonomischen Analyse. Nach dem
Artikel 10:101 verfolgt der Schadensersatz nicht nur dem Ziel der Kompensation sondern
auch der Vermeidung von Schäden. Der Beitrag kritisiert zahlreiche Regeln der Principles
die nicht mit dem Ziel einer Prävention in Einklang sind. Die Autoren diskutieren die
Beschränkung des Schadensersatzes auf normale Schäden, die Abhängigkeit des
gewährten Rechtsschutzes von der Natur der geschützten Interessen, der sehr enge
Maßstab der Gefährdungshaftung, die sich auf abnormal gefährliche Tätigkeiten
beschränkt und die Regeln zur Messung van Schadensersatzleistungen. Zum Abschluss
bietet der Beitrag eine Gesamtwürdigung des von den Principles geleisteten Beitrags für
die Entwicklung des Haftungsrechts in Europa.
Introduction
Recently, the European Group on Tort Law published its Principles of European Tort
Law. This group consists of about twenty members from Europe, Israel, South Africa
and the USA, who are all well–known tort law scholars. The Principles ‘have been
drafted on the basis of an extensive comparative research project extending over
more than a decade and focusing on the most important elements of tort law.’1 The
goal of the Principles is to serve as a basis for the enhancement and harmonization of
the law of torts in Europe; they should serve as ‘a kind of framework for the further
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development of a truly harmonized European tort law.’2 In this paper, both goals of
the Principles (harmonization and enhancement) will be critically assessed from a
Law and Economics point of view.
In the first part of the paper, we will briefly investigate whether harmoniza-
tion of tort law is desirable. A traditional legal argument is that unification based on
common principles of law may guarantee a more consistent legal system than the
current selective and piecemeal harmonization of parts of private law by way of EC
Directives. In addition, it is argued that differences in legal rules increase legal
uncertainty and lead to problems in the management of enterprises and in legal prac-
tice, which hinders cross-border trade. In the Law and Economics literature, a more
cautious approach to harmonization dominates. Whereas comparative lawyers stress
the need for internal consistency of the law, legal economists focus their attention on
the external consistency of the legal system with goals of social welfare. On the one
hand, Law and Economics scholars stress the benefits of divergent legal rules.
Competition between legal orders allows satisfying a greater number of preferences
and enables learning processes. On the other hand, Law and Economics scholars
admit that competition between legal orders may fail because of interstate externali-
ties or a ‘race to the bottom’. Also scale economies and transaction cost savings may
justify harmonization. By contrast, the popular market integration argument is
conceptually weak and lacks empirical evidence. The first part of this paper will
discuss the main arguments in favour or against harmonization of tort law.
In the second part of the paper, we will investigate whether the Principles lead
to an enhancement of tort law, judged from a Law and Economics perspective. The
European Group on Tort Law did not limit its task to finding the largest common
denominator, but also posed the question whether such a common core would be the
best solution for Europe.3 To judge whether the Group has been able to define the
‘better law’, it is necessary to clarify what the drafters of the Principles consider to be
the normative goals of tort law. According to Article 10:101 of the Principles,
damages serve the goal of compensation, but also the aim of preventing harm. This
suggests that the preventive function of tort law, which is stressed in the Law and
Economics literature, is taken seriously. However, many elements of the Principles
turn out to be contradictory to Law and Economics recommendations. Within the
scope of this paper, a detailed analysis of the full text of the Principles cannot be
provided. Therefore, we will limit the discussion to the most important points of
difference with the economic approach to tort law. These include: the rule that
damages are limited to normal losses, so that abnormally high losses need not be
compensated; the rule that life, bodily or mental integrity, human dignity and liberty
receive ‘the most extensive protection’, property rights ‘extensive protection’ and
513
2 J. SPIER, ‘General Introduction’, Principles of European Tort Law, 2005, p 16, no. 30.
3 Ibid, p 15, no. 20.
pure economic interests or contractual interests ‘more limited protection’, the very
narrowly defined rule on strict liability, which only concerns abnormally dangerous
activities, and a number of rules for assessing damages, such as compensation for
fatal accidents and the specific problems of immaterial losses. It will be shown why
these rules are not in perfect harmony with an economic approach to tort law.
Besides this critical perspective, the analysis will also reveal that many rules
contained in the Principles are largely in conformity with the insights from the
economic analysis of tort law. This applies to the elements of the fault standard, some
of the rules on causation and the innovative concept of proportional liability. Finally,
the concluding remarks will provide an overall assessment of the importance of the
Principles for the future development of tort law in Europe.
1. Is Harmonization of TortLaw Desirable?
1.1 The Traditional Arguments: Legal Certainty, Market Integration and the
Need of a ‘Level Playing Field’
There are many scholarly legal publications that favour a far-reaching harmonization of
private law or even a European Civil Code.4 In these publications, the question whether
a European private law is desirable is not critically examined. The questions asked
rather relate to how and when private law will be harmonized. The major concern is to
create a broad framework for harmonization that would guarantee more uniformity
than the current selective and piecemeal harmonization of parts of private law by way
of Directives.5 As to the necessity of harmonization, the analysis in the legal literature
is usually very simplistic. Several lawyers advance the costs of different tort systems to
justify the harmonization of tort law. It is argued that differences in legal rules increase
legal uncertainty and lead to problems in the management of enterprises and in legal
practice, which hinders cross–border trade. The latter argument is also very popular
with European bureaucrats, who usually add that differences in tort law create
inequality in competitive conditions across the member states.6 Harmonization is thus
presented as an instrument to create a ‘level playing field’ for industry.
The argument about increased legal certainty and its beneficial impact on the
volume of inter-state trade is not convincing. There is no empirical evidence that differ-
ences in legal systems do indeed hinder cross–border transactions in a significant way.
The EC Commission simply assumes that legal diversity impedes cross-border trade
and that harmonization of law will encourage enterprises to engage in such transac-
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Law International, The Hague 2002.
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tions. Unfortunately, this is merely a presumption and there is no empirical evidence
supporting such expectation. Large, multinational enterprises may not be deterred by
the need to adapt to local rules from entering foreign markets.7 The case law of the
European Court of Justice testifies that these companies may combat restrictive rules
of the import state by challenging their conformity with the principle of free movement
of goods. Negative integration may thus function as an effective mechanism to open up
markets.8 Small and medium size firms may be more reluctant to bear the additional
costs of adapting to the legal rules of foreign markets (or to challenge restrictive rules).
However, the reactions of the business associations representing these firms to the
proposals on a European contract law rejected the idea that full harmonization was
necessary to foster competition in the internal market.9
Also the need to create a level playing field is not a valid argument in favour
of harmonization. First, the rules of tort law are the same for all actors within a rele-
vant jurisdiction, so that distortions of competition to the detriment of foreign
suppliers are avoided.10 Second, the argument that states may obtain a competitive
advantage by enacting particular legal rules neglects that international trade is based
on comparative advantages. It is not necessarily illegitimate to exploit differences in
legal rules. The goal to create a level playing field for industry seems to be in contra-
diction with the essence of international trade itself. Exploiting differences in legal
systems may be objected on distributional grounds, but it is not necessarily in
conflict with the goal of allocative efficiency. If legal rules confer a competitive
advantage on firms in a particular Member State, the consequence will be that prices
for consumer goods in the international market will be reduced, with welfare gains
going to consumers who previously had to pay higher prices. Some losses will be
incurred by industries having to comply with stricter laws, but gains will flow to other
industries offering cheaper products produced in conformity with less demanding
legal norms. The aggregate welfare consequences for the entire common market are
likely to be beneficial. Third, harmonization of a particular field of law, such as tort
law, is not an appropriate remedy to correct inequalities in doing business, which
have an impact on the competitive position of firms across Europe. The problem with
a partial harmonization plan is that it does not equalize all costs. The costs of
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complying with a particular set of rules are only one component of the total costs of
production. Harmonizing one part of the legal system (e.g. tort law) will leave
competitive distortions in other fields of law intact. Furthermore, the goal of
creating a level playing field will not be reached, since firms in some countries will
maintain an advantage in terms of infrastructure, wages, labour productivity, and so
on. Member States that perform well on the non-harmonized components of costs
will thus retain competitive benefits. The ultimate answer is to eliminate the possi-
bility of competition over any of the costs mentioned, including both costs of
complying with divergent legal rules and other production costs. Such a comprehen-
sive Community intervention would equal an outright rejection of the subsidiarity
principle.
1.2 Economic Analysis of Harmonization
In contrast with the legal literature, the economic analysis of harmonization takes a
much more cautious attitude. On the one hand, Law and Economics scholars stress
the benefits of divergent legal rules. Competition between legal orders allows satis-
fying a greater number of preferences and enables learning processes. On the other
hand, Law and Economics scholars admit that competition between legal orders may
fail because of interstate externalities or prisoners’ dilemmas between Member
States causing a ‘race to the bottom’. Another argument in favour of harmonization
is that centralization may achieve scale economies or reduce transaction costs.
1.2.1 Benefits of Competition Between Tort Laws: Satisfying a Greater Number of
Preferences and Enabling Learning Processes
The argument that different legal rules may satisfy a greater number of preferences
merits particular attention in the field of tort law. First, there may be different views
regarding the goals of tort law across Member States. An efficiency approach stresses
the goal of prevention (through deterring dangerous conduct), whereas a social
justice approach emphasizes the goal of compensation. Since achieving deterrence
and compensation simultaneously may be impossible,11 legal systems will not be able
to escape from trade-offs between these competing goals. Decisions as to which goal
should take precedence over the other may differ across EC Member States. Second,
the legal system is part of the culture of a nation. Social norms about what is desirable
behaviour vary across the European Member States. Those who regularly travel
across Europe will realize that social norms on what is desirable behaviour in a traffic
situation are clearly different in Naples from the social norms governing driving
behaviour in Sweden. What can be termed reasonable care in Stockholm may be
counterproductive, excessive care in Naples. Also the degree of wealth influences the
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choice of liability rules, in particular the degree of care expected from manufac-
turers. Tort law imposes costs on producers, which will be passed on into consumer
prices (as far as elasticity of demand allows price increases). Wealthy countries may
prefer stricter standards, since the people living there can financially afford such
rules. Conversely, poor countries may prefer more lenient tort rules. Whereas exces-
sive noise may be seen as negligent behaviour in the former countries, it may be toler-
ated in the latter countries since obeying noise limits increases the costs of
production and consumer prices. Product liability offers another example: wealthy
countries may prefer strict liability (irrespective of the price increases such a rule
may cause), whereas poor countries may prefer products that are less safe but can be
financially afforded by a large group of consumers. In sum, tort standards should be
sensitive to social norms and differences in wealth across countries.12
A second argument in favour of divergent tort rules is that competition
between legal systems enables learning processes. Tort law contains many vague
concepts, such as the fault standard and criteria to assess causation. Different inter-
pretations of these concepts may provide important information about the perform-
ance of the legal rule in real-life cases. Trial-and-error is particularly important when
there is a high degree of uncertainty on the economic effects of a given liability rule.
If a single Member State changes its tort system, for example by introducing a rule of
strict liability for a particular activity, other Member States may prefer to wait to take
similar steps until the economic effects of the legislative change have become clear.
There is a large American empirical literature on the social costs of divergent acci-
dent rules.13 Europe offers a unique laboratory, in which the effects of 25 divergent
tort rules could be tested. A ‘top down’ harmonization impedes such learning
processes, which are particularly important when there is a great deal of uncertainty
on the economic effects of different liability systems and the ensuing total costs of
accidents. Competition between legal systems may thus increase the efficiency of tort
law. One may object that a common system of European tort law does not need to be
inflexible and may remain open to improvements and innovation. However, in
contrast with a European contract law that may be offered as a twenty-sixth choice,
parties involved in a tort setting are generally not able to choose the applicable law
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beforehand. Competition between different tort laws can only take place at the level
of the Member States, which may choose to either follow the European rules or keep
their own legal systems unchanged. Since private parties cannot profit from an addi-
tional layer of vertical competition between EU law and national laws, the scope for
learning processes in the area of tort law is more limited than in the field of contract
law. For this reason, it is very important to safeguard the horizontal competition
between the tort laws of the Member States.
1.2.2 Arguments in Favour of Harmonization
A major argument in favour of harmonization of laws is the need to internalize negative
interstate externalities. From an economic point of view, states should be able to
choose the rules which best satisfy the preferences of their citizens as long as they also
bear the full costs of their legal decisions.14 Where trans-boundary effects occur,
harmonization may be required to avoid that costs are thrown upon other jurisdictions.
River pollution is an obvious example: citizens in downstream states suffer from lenient
environmental water standards in upstream states. Negotiations between the countries
involved may not lead to optimal outcomes because of opportunistic behaviour. This
may provide a powerful argument in favour of central rules on water pollution.15
To justify harmonization of tort law, two things must be shown. First, rules of
tort law must affect transactions with interstate repercussions. Second, it must be
impossible to fully internalize negative externalities arising from interstate transac-
tions by applying national rules of tort law. In the search for trans-boundary torts,
product liability can be regarded as a major area of private law to be governed by
European law, leaving the problem of differences in wealth aside. Sellers of defective
products should not escape liability when harm occurs outside the territory of the
exporting state. Interestingly, product liability was also the first topic covered by the EC
harmonization process.16 Community intervention into matters that are for the most
part local cannot be justified by the interstate externalities argument. To some extent,
the EC legislative programmes also cover national torts. For example, the European
environmental liability programme17 applies to damage to biodiversity, which is not
necessarily trans-boundary (e.g. soil pollution and protection of habitats). The exter-
nalities’ argument throws a different light on the criticism of lawyers that the unifica-
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tion of tort law has been very selective. There may be very good reasons why the EC does
not intervene in tort situations, which do not entail significant cross-border effects.
Tort lawyers are right in arguing that a selective harmonization causes costs due to a
decreased legal consistency of different national legal systems. However, it may be
doubted whether the benefits of legal consistency outweigh the costs of harmonization
(satisfying less preferences, not enabling learning processes) in the absence of inter-
state externalities.
Even if an impact beyond the borders of a single Member State can be shown,
a further inquiry as to the possibilities of national private laws to cope with the rele-
vant externalities is needed to support the conclusion that European tort law is
needed. Manufacturers of defective products are generally liable in damages for harm
suffered in export markets. If the law of the export state does not allow recovery for
certain types of damage or even totally exempts the product from the scope of the
product liability law, compensation will be available according to the law of the
import state if the law of the latter country does not contain similar exclusions.
Hence, if a defective product is exported, negative externalities do arise but they do
not automatically constitute a sufficient cause for Community action. European law
would accomplish a useful task only in very specific circumstances, where the rules
of the import country do not allow a full internalization. The task of European law
would then be to fill the gaps when compensation claims and, therefore, full inter-
nalization of cross border externalities are impossible. An example is a Member State
law, which does not easily allow recovery unless the victim can prove beyond reason-
able doubt (for example, because the threshold of proportional liability is not
reached)18 that the particular manufacturer caused his loss. This line of reasoning
points at inefficiencies in national tort laws and thus parallels the Public Choice
argument, holding that central rules may be more efficient than rules enacted at
lower levels of government.19 Remarkably, the EC Directive does not harmonize
different legal approaches to problems of causation.20 Consequently, the view that
EC law is more efficient than national liability rules is not supported by real-life
harmonization.
The next argument in favour of harmonization is that regulatory competition
may cause a ‘race to the bottom’. A very popular argument in the American debate on
federalism is that competition between jurisdictions may lead to ‘bad’ law. States may
reduce workers’ protection, lower environmental standards or soften the regulatory
burden on enterprises in other ways, in order to attract investment and profit from
increased tax revenue. A state will gain in the struggle to attract firms by choosing in
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favour of lax regulation when other states do not act in the same way. However, when
states are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma they will all reduce the regulatory burden
(race to the bottom). As a consequence, only businesses will gain. Centralization,
including harmonization of laws, may then be needed to generate efficient outcomes.
However, in the field of tort law it seems highly doubtful that EC member states will
strive for low levels of victim protection to attract industry. Even in areas of law where
one might expect a substantial impact of the desire to attract businesses on the choice
of the regulatory burden for industry, theoretical and empirical research shows that
there is no convincing proof for a race to the bottom and that, by contrast, a ‘race to
the top’ may take place. For example, there is no support for the claim of a race to the
bottom in environmental law (or the ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis), neither theoreti-
cally nor empirically.21 Firms will not relocate plants to escape from stringent envi-
ronmental regulations. Other factors, such as the availability of a good infrastructure,
labour conditions (unionization of the labour force) and taxes may be much more
important in location decisions of business. It seems even more unlikely that firms will
relocate plants to profit from lenient tort laws. A race to the bottom could theoretically
materialize if Member States try to attract industry by enacting lenient product liability
and product safety laws. The result would then be an overall reduction of product
quality. Besides lack of empirical proof, this reasoning has a number of weaknesses.
Since harm often occurs in export markets, Member States will face difficulties in
attracting manufacturing industries that sell a great part of their products outside the
domestic market. Even if product safety and liability standards are more lenient in the
export state, the industry will not escape from higher costs triggered by the stricter
liability regime of the import state. The story is different only with respect to retailers
who will be sued by consumers in the jurisdiction where they are located.
Remarkably, the EC Product Liability Directive does not apply to retailers; only
producers are held liable. Hence, EC consumer law does not prevent a race to the
bottom in markets where it could theoretically occur.22 More generally, it is doubtful
whether states will engage in a race to the bottom if they cannot charge the industry
for using lenient rules of tort law. At this point, a comparison with the alleged race to
the bottom in American corporate law is illuminating; one must not forget that 16
percent of the total tax revenue of Delaware is derived from incorporation fees.23
Finally, the race to the bottom argument supposes that firms, which have to comply
with stricter rules, suffer a competitive disadvantage. However, if rules of tort law are
efficiency motivated (rather than based on distributional considerations) they will
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increase and not decrease the competitiveness of firms. In the latter case, the race
will be for the ‘top’ rather than for the ‘bottom’.
The last argument in favour of harmonization is the achievement of scale
economies or the reduction of transaction costs. However, it must immediately be
added that the importance of this argument varies across different fields of law. Scale
economies may be important for the design of efficient rules of public law, such as
safety regulation, but negligible in other fields of law, such as private law.
Comparative lawyers often refer to the need for legal certainty as a crucial quality
feature of any legal system: if rules differ, information costs increase and the outcome
of cases is less predictable. In economic terms, this argument refers to transaction
cost savings generated by harmonization of laws. At first sight, uniform rules may
reduce information costs, since knowledge of several different legal systems is no
longer required. It is, however, doubtful that uniform laws on their own will be effec-
tive in reducing uncertainty. To start with, problems will already emerge when the
‘uniform’ rules have to be translated into the different languages of the Member
States. Language differences resulting from the translations of Directives can lead to
different interpretations of the same provision. Even if interpretation problems can
be avoided through adequate translations, legal certainty will not automatically be
achieved. Unlike goods, legal rules cannot easily be transported from one state to
another. It does not suffice that the legal systems of the EC Member States use the
same wording. This wording must also be understood as having the same content in
the different legal systems. ‘Legal transplants’ sensu stricto may be simply impossible.
Legrand emphasizes that there could only occur a meaningful legal transplant when
both the propositional statement as such and its invested meaning – which jointly
constitute the rule – are transported from one state to another. ‘At best, what can be
displaced from one jurisdiction to another is, literally, a meaningless form of words.
(...) In any meaningful sense of the term, legal transplants, therefore, cannot
happen.’24 Common uniform rules only increase legal certainty when a uniform
interpretation of the law in each Member State is secured. Interpretation problems
will be particularly severe when Directives use vague notions. In such cases, the
overall effect of harmonization may be increased transaction costs, rather than the
legal certainty so much sought by legal scholars.
2. Economic Analysis of the Main Articles of the Principles of European Tort Law
2.1 The Goals of Tort Law
Article 10:101 of the Principles defines the nature and purpose of damages, in the
following way: ‘Damages are a money payment to compensate the victim, that is to say,
to restore him, so far as money can, to the position he would have been in if the wrong
complained of had not been committed. Damages also serve the aim of preventing
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harm’. This definition reflects the views of the drafters of the Principles on the goals of
tort law. Compensation is seen as the main goal of tort law and prevention is added as a
secondary goal. The explicit reference to the prevention of harm makes clear that the
authors of the Principles have been influenced by legal economists stressing the deter-
rent function of tort law.25 However, the economic approach to tort law has not been
accepted up to its entire consequences. In an economic approach, compensation as such
is never the goal. If it was, the only acceptable rule would be strict liability without any
defence of contributory negligence. Fault liability cannot be explained as an instrument
to guarantee the payment of damages, since the harm caused must only be compensated
if it can be shown that the tortfeasor behaved negligently. According to the dominant
view in Law and Economics, the goal of tort law is twofold: accident prevention and
optimal spreading of losses, or, in the terminology of Guido Calabresi: the reduction of
primary and secondary accident costs.26 In addition, the administrative costs of
achieving primary and secondary cost reduction should be taken into account, so that
this reduction is not outweighed by an increase in the system costs. To reduce primary
costs of accidents, judges must hold the injurer liable if he took less than efficient care.
Economically optimal care levels are reached where the marginal costs of care equal the
marginal benefits resulting from the decrease in expected harm. Tort law may also serve
the purpose of improving loss spreading. If injurers are better able to bear the risk than
victims, it will be efficient to impose liability on the former. It is important to realize that
there may be inconsistencies between these goals. For example, if a traffic accident is
caused both by the negligent behaviour of a car driver and a pedestrian, the latter should
bear a part of the losses to give him an incentive to take efficient care. If the entire loss
is to be compensated by the car driver (in practice: the latter’s insurance company) loss
spreading may be improved if the insurance company of the car driver is better able to
bear the risk than the pedestrian, whose losses are not entirely covered by public health
insurance. However, excluding liability of the pedestrian may increase the primary costs
of accidents. The definition of damages (Article 10:101) gives the impression that the
authors of the Principles regard compensation as more important than the prevention of
accidents and that insufficient attention is paid to the optimal spreading of losses. There
are a number of rules contained in the Principles, which confirm that compensation
is the main goal and seem to indicate that only lip service is paid to the goal of preven-
tion. If prevention was taken seriously, it would be difficult to explain the exclusion
of punitive damages, the under-compensation of the harm caused by fatal accidents
and the reduction of damages in the light of the financial situation of the parties. The
Principles offer no basis for claiming punitive damages. From a perspective of preven-
tion, punitive damages may be an instrument to compensate for the low probability
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that injurers are caught.27 According to Article 10:202 (2) ‘in the case of death,
persons such as family members whom the deceased maintained or would have main-
tained if death had not occurred are treated as having suffered recoverable damage to
the extent of loss of that support’. From a viewpoint of prevention (to fully internalize
the negative externalities), also the harm of the deceased must be compensated. The
relevant benchmark is the value the deceased attached to his life. The average value
of statistical life is much higher than the money payments to people maintained by
the deceased person (see section 2.5.2). Article 10:401 allows a reduction of damages
‘in an exceptional case, if in the light of the financial situation of the parties full
compensation would be an oppressive burden to the defendant.’ A reduction of
damages reduces the precautionary measures taken by the tortfeasor below the level
of efficient care (see section 2.5.3). Also the narrow rule on strict liability (discussed
below in section 2.4) is not in conformity with a liability regime that should give
adequate incentives to prevent accidents.
2.2 Fault Standard
According to Article 4:101 of the Principles, a person is liable on the basis of fault for
intentional or negligent violation of the required standard of conduct.28 Article
4:102(1) subsequently describes the required standard of conduct, in the following
way: ‘The required standard of conduct is that of the reasonable person in the circum-
stances, and depends, in particular, on the nature and value of the protected interest
involved, the dangerousness of the activity, the expertise to be expected of a person
carrying it on, the foreseeability of the damage, the relationship of proximity or
special reliance between those involved, as well as the availability and the costs of
precautionary or alternative methods’. The various factors mentioned for deter-
mining the required standard of conduct are largely consistent with the economic
approach to fault liability. As will be shown below, the added value of the economic
approach is that it does not merely list the relevant factors for establishing that a
person is liable on the basis of fault, but also clarifies the relationship between the
different elements of the required standard of conduct.
From an economic point of view, the key difference between strict liability and
fault liability is that under the latter rule it must be investigated whether the injurer
acted differently than he should have done, while this question is irrelevant under the
former rule. To establish negligence, which is the dominant form of fault liability, it
523
27 See e.g. S. SHAVELL, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2004, p 244.
28 For the economic analysis of intentional torts, see e.g. W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, ‘An
Economic Theory of Intentional Torts’, 1. IRLE (International Review of Law and Economics) 1981,
p 127-154; D.D. ELLIS, ‘An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts: A Comment’, 3. IRLE 1983, 
p 45-57;.J. ARLEN, ‘Tort Damages’, in: B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics. Volume II. Civil Law and Economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2000, p 696; R.A.
POSNER, Economic Analysis of Law, 6th edition, Aspen Publishers, New York 2003, pp 205, 206.
must be shown that the injurer has not been sufficiently careful. In order to assess
whether the injurer has taken enough care, a comparison must be made between the
costs of additional precautionary measures and the benefits thereof in terms of a
reduction of the expected accident losses. The expected accident losses consist of the
accident probability multiplied by the size of the losses if an accident occurs. It is
economically desirable that the injurer takes additional care measures as long as the
additional costs of care are lower than the reduction in expected accident losses,
since in this way the total costs of accidents will decrease. In what became known as
the Hand formula, judge Learned Hand has expressed this weighing of costs and
benefits in the mathematical formula B < pL. In algebraic terms, B denotes the
burden of precautions, p the accident probability and L the losses.29 In the Law and
Economics literature, it has been clarified that judges should not compare the
absolute levels of these elements, but the marginal values thereof. The relevant ques-
tion is whether an additional care measure costs less or more than the benefits it
yields. The optimal level of care is found where the marginal costs of care equal the
marginal benefits. Below this efficient level of care, the additional costs of care are
lower than the resulting decrease in expected accident losses, so that it is desirable
that the additional care measure is taken. Above the optimal level of care, the addi-
tional costs of care are higher than the benefits thereof, so that this care measure
would be inefficient and thus is not desirable from an economic point of view.30
The different elements of the Hand formula can be traced back in the formu-
lation of Article 4:102(1), even though the wording does not exactly correspond with
the economic terminology. The costs of precaution (B) appear as ‘the availability and
the costs of precautionary or alternative methods’.31 The expected accident losses
(pL) are referred at as the ‘dangerousness of the activity’ and ‘the value of the
protected interests involved’. The reference in Article 4:102 to ‘the expertise to be
expected of a person carrying the activity on’ relates to the relative costs and benefits
of the different elements of the required standard of conduct. An example may illus-
trate the importance of this distinction. The costs of taking care in a traffic situation
can be assumed to be lower for e.g. policemen and taxi drivers, because they are
professionally involved in traffic, are well trained and have a huge experience. It is
therefore desirable to hold them to a higher standard of conduct, because their costs
of taking care are relatively low. Finally, also foreseeability of the damage is a relevant
factor in assessing fault liability, because it is not possible to adapt ones behaviour to
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dangers that cannot be foreseen. However, it is important to provide actors with
incentives to obtain information about the possible risks of their behaviour.
Therefore, one should only conclude that a certain danger was unforeseeable if the
costs of discovering the danger were higher than the benefits of discovery, which
consist of the possibility to adapt the care level to the real magnitude of the danger.32
It follows from the above that Law and Economics makes it possible to clarify
the mutual relationship between several of the elements mentioned in Article
4:102(1). It also becomes clear that the ‘nature of the protected interest’ in itself is not
relevant for an economic determination of negligence, because it is the size of the
losses that matters. This implies that Article 2:102 of the Principles, which grants the
‘most extensive protection’ to life, bodily or mental integrity, human dignity and
liberty, whereas property rights receive only ‘extensive protection’ and pure economic
interests or contractual relationships even more limited protection, does not fit well in
the economic analysis of tort law. However, in situations where courts do not have
enough information to make a good assessment of the size of the losses, or where such
an assessment would be very costly, the nature of the protected interest might serve as
a proxy with which the size of the losses is estimated. By using such rules of thumb,
courts might be able to reduce the administrative costs of determining the losses.
Here, the trade-off between administrative costs on the one hand and reduction of
primary and secondary accident costs on the other hand becomes clear.33
Article 4:102(1) also mentions the availability and costs of ‘alternative
methods’. If a less dangerous way exists to reach a given objective, this alternative
method should be chosen.34 This requirement makes economic sense, because it will
reduce the total costs of accidents. In the economic analysis of tort law, the concept
of ‘alternative methods’ was further developed by Mark Grady, who formulated the
theory of the ‘untaken precautions’.35 According to the general economic theory of
fault liability, the court first determines the optimal level of care in the abstract, and
subsequently assesses whether the injurer has taken efficient care. Grady argues that
in real-life cases, it is up to the plaintiff to suggest care measures that the injurer
could have taken, but did not take. The court then compares the care measures of the
injurer to the suggested untaken precautions. If the total accident costs would have
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been lower had the untaken precautions been taken, the injurer is deemed negligent.
A study of Dutch, German and English tort liability rules suggests that this approach
is consistent with the case law in those countries. Therefore, the untaken precaution
approach seems to be a good candidate for shaping a European negligence rule.
Holding an injurer liable because he did not take efficient precautionary measures is
both economically efficient and consistent with legal practice in the countries that
where investigated.36
Paragraph 2 of Article 4:102 provides for the possibility to adjust the fault
standard ‘when due to age, mental or physical disability or extraordinary circum-
stances the person cannot be expected to conform to it’. The Principles deliberately
do not mention a specific age below which a person cannot be held liable, but leave
this to be determined on a case by case basis.37 From a Law and Economics perspec-
tive, holding little children liable or deeming them contributory negligent does not
make sense, because liability is incapable of influencing the accident probability. In
other words, the accident situation is unilateral, because only the injurer can influ-
ence the accident risk. However, the age limit should not be set too high. From the
age of about seven, children do have insights into dangers and they can correct their
behaviour. Therefore, it makes sense to hold them liable. In order for the fault rule to
be able to provide ex ante care incentives, the rule should be clear. Hence, the use of
specific age limits, preferably lower than the Dutch limit of 14 years, is advisable. The
German system of different age groups corresponding with increasing levels of
liability nicely reflects these economic insights.38
It depends on the situation whether it is economically sound to hold a person
with a mental or physical disability liable according to the same standard as persons
without the disability. If the disability is so severe that the person cannot control his
behaviour, liability will not lead to changes in behaviour and will only cause adminis-
trative costs. If the person can control his behaviour, but his care costs are higher
than those of a person without the disability, his personal optimal care level is lower
than the average optimal care level. If it is possible to distinguish between the
different groups of persons at low cost, it is desirable to use a lower standard of care.
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In case law, children older than seven are separated into three age groups, making them responsible
according to the extent to which they could understand the danger of their actions and adapt their
behaviour to this insight: seven to ten years, eleven to fourteen years and older than fourteen years.
For example, a blind pedestrian can be easily recognized by his cane, so that others
can adapt their behaviour to his lower optimal care level. Conversely, if the adminis-
trative costs of distinguishing between the different groups become too large, or if
the distinction may lead to strategic behaviour (people faking a disability), it is better
to use the general fault standard for all groups.39 A positive side effect thereof will be
that less capable people, who cannot meet the required standard, might refrain from
the activity altogether, which is an efficient way to prevent harm.
2.3 Causation
Article 3:101 opens the section on causation by formulating the condicio sine qua
non (csqn) requirement: ‘An activity or conduct is a cause of the victim’s damage if,
in the absence of the activity, the damage would not have occurred’.40 Article 3:102
states that in case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have caused
the loss at the same time, each activity is regarded as a cause of the victim’s damage.
Hence, although none of the activities is a csqn, each is regarded as a cause. This
makes good sense from an economic perspective, because if neither activity was
regarded as cause, tort law would not be able to provide care incentives to the parties
engaged in these activities. This would lead to an amount of care below the efficient
level and to higher than optimal accident costs.
Article 3:103 deals with the problem of alternative causation. The difference
with the concurrent causes covered by Article 3:102 is that, in the latter case, each
activity would have caused the loss if one disregards the other activities, while with
alternative causes it is uncertain which of the activities caused the loss.41 Article 3:103
states that each activity is regarded as a cause to the extent corresponding with the like-
lihood that it may have caused the victim’s damage. In this way, the Principles adopt the
idea of proportional liability. In our view, it is rather odd to regard the different activi-
ties as ‘proportional causes’. It would have been more logical to regard all activities as
causes, and to reach the situation of proportional liability in the phase of the assess-
ment of the damages, by making each actor liable for the proportion of the losses that
corresponds to the likelihood that the particular activity caused the damage.42 We will
further elaborate upon the topic of proportional liability in the section on damages.
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Article 3:104 states that ‘if an activity has definitely and irreversibly led the
victim to suffer damage, a subsequent activity, which alone would have caused the
same damage, is to be disregarded’. The justification for this rule is that the second
activity is no csqn for the loss.43 From an economic perspective, however, it is not
desirable to systematically exclude liability of the second actor. Apart from the fact
that one could argue that the first activity is no csqn either – after all, the second
activity would have caused the same loss –, it may also be desirable that the second
actor gets incentives to take efficient care. His activity would have caused a loss if the
first activity had not been present. If his behaviour was negligent, he should have
taken more care (see section 2.2), and if his behaviour falls under a rule of strict
liability, the actor should have based his care decisions on the losses he may cause
(see section 2.4). The circumstance that there is another activity, which is not
controlled by the actor, does not influence the ex ante desirability of taking care. It is
a matter of chance if there is another activity causing the same loss and if that is the
case, which activity is the first and which is the second.
The circumstances of the case at hand determine whether liability of the second
actor makes economic sense or not. Assume that two cars are speeding and the drivers
cannot stop in time to avoid hitting a pedestrian crossing the street. In this example, it
should not matter who happens to hit the pedestrian first, since both car drivers should
have reduced their speed. Apart from providing inadequate incentives to take care,
trying to determine who hit the pedestrian first would also lead to higher administrative
costs. Therefore, regarding both cars as cause of the losses makes economic sense.
Admittedly, one of the cases described in the Commentary to the Principles seems to
provide fewer arguments to hold the second actor liable.44 A first actor collides with the
car of the victim, which after the accident is a total loss. A few minutes later, the second
actor crashes into the wreck. In this example, the argument of additional administrative
costs does not hold, because it is clear who the first actor was and who the second. In
addition, the full range of possible accidents and the resulting losses determines the
optimal level of care for the second actor. Because the car is already a total loss, crashing
into the wreck does not cause additional damage (the wreck already has a value of zero).
The conclusion is that the rule of Article 3:104 makes economic sense in some, but not
in all, situations. It may be added that the second paragraph of the article, stating that
‘the subsequent activity is taken into consideration if it has led to additional or aggra-
vated damage’, is in conformity with economic insights. The reason is that the second
actor has caused more losses than already occurred and he should take these losses into
consideration when determining his care level.
Article 3:201 non-exhaustively lists a number of factors that are relevant in
determining whether and to what extent damage may be attributed to a person,
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provided that his activity is considered as a cause of the losses. The first factor is fore-
seeability, taking into account in particular ‘the magnitude of the damage in relation
to the normal consequences of such an activity’. The Commentary gives the following
examples: an explosion of an oil refinery causing larger than normal losses and a car
accident in which persons earning high incomes are severely injured, so that they
cannot perform their function for many years.45 Economic analysis of law teaches
that is not desirable to limit damages to the normal losses. In reaching his care deci-
sions, the injurer must take account of all possible accidents, each with its own prob-
abilities and size of the harm. If abnormally high losses do not have to be entirely
compensated, actors will not fully be confronted with the expected losses they cause
and will receive inadequate care incentives. It is illuminating to add that the logical
counterpart of limiting liability for abnormally high losses is increasing liability for
abnormally low losses. Such a rule cannot be found in the tort laws of European coun-
tries. Consequently, in order to give the correct financial incentives, compensation
for abnormally large losses should not be limited.46 Only if losses are so unlikely that
they are totally overlooked, liability will not lead to prevention and only cause admin-
istrative costs. Excluding liability for the latter type of accidents therefore makes
economic sense.47 The drawback of this rule, however, is that actors do no longer
have incentives to carefully investigate the possible dangers of their behaviour. For
this reason, only losses that are unforeseeable in the economic sense should be
excluded from liability. As long as the benefits of discovering an unlikely danger are
higher than the costs of the additional investigations, liability for harm caused should
remain unrestricted (see section 2.2). Finally, foreseeability should not be an element
in the assessment of causation because it has nothing to do with the question if the
injurer has made the losses happen. Foreseeability can be relevant in the phase where
liability is established, because actors cannot adapt their behaviour to dangers that
they cannot know.
The second factor mentioned in Article 3:201 is the nature and value of the
protected interests. We have already discussed this factor in section 2.2 above. The
third factor of Article 3:201, the basis of liability, implies that attribution of the harm
to a person seems more appropriate if liability is based on fault rather than in cases of
strict liability.48 This is not in conformity with economic insights. To provide incen-
tives to take efficient care, an actor should be confronted with all losses that he has
caused, irrespective of the basis of liability. If the actor only faces partial liability, he
receives inadequate incentives. Also the protective purpose of the violated rule is
mentioned as a relevant factor in Article 3:201, although it is admitted that this factor
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will often not come into play, as liability will probably not be established at all when
the violated rule only protects specific other interests.49
The last factor mentioned in Article 3:201 is again in conformity with
economic insights, although the wording (‘the extent of the ordinary risks of life’) is
a bit obscure. The example in the Commentary clarifies what is meant.50 A victim is
slightly injured in a car accident for which the actor is liable. After a few days, he
decides to consult his physician, but on the way to the physician he is again hit by a
car. In this example, the latter accident is regarded as an ordinary risk of life so that
the first actor is not liable for the consequences of the second accident. In the
economic literature, this type of accident is known as a ‘coincidental accident’.51 The
tort is a csqn for the losses, but the tort does not increase the likelihood or the severity
of the particular accident. A famous example is Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough,52
involving a case where a decayed tree fell down at the exact time when a speeding
trolley was passing by. As speeding does not increase the probability of being hit by
falling trees, liability cannot lead to a lower probability of such accidents and it would
only create administrative costs. Speeding was a csqn, because if the trolley had driven
at the correct speed, it would not yet have reached the tree when it fell down. Hence,
there is retrospective causation (but for the speeding, the accident would not have
happened), but no prospective causation (speeding does not cause this type of
losses).53 The legally relevant cause in the example given in the Commentary, there-
fore, is not the first car accident but the second one. If the second car driver was negli-
gent, there is a prospective causal link between his negligent behaviour and the
losses, because driving negligently increases the probability of being involved in a
traffic accident.
If there is retrospective but no prospective causation, liability is not economi-
cally desirable. Also in the opposite situation, where there is prospective but no retro-
spective causation, liability may not make economic sense. This brings us to a topic (not
treated in the Principles), which is highly relevant under a rule of fault liability: the so-
called theory of the ‘lawful alternative’.54 If an actor was negligent and if losses
occurred, but the actor can prove that the same losses would have occurred if he had
taken due care, the negligence is no csqn for the losses and the actor should not be held
liable. Hence, csqn should not be required between the activity and the losses but
between the negligence (or fault) and the losses. An example may clarify the relevance
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of this distinction.55 Suppose that due care implies that a cricket field must be
surrounded by a fence of 10 feet high, to prevent balls from causing damage to people
or property in the neighbourhood. Occasionally a ball may fly over this fence, but this
happens so rarely that it is not worthwhile to build a higher fence. In other words, the
costs of increasing the height of the fence exceed the benefits thereof. Now suppose
that the owner of a field erects a fence of only 9 feet high, so that he is negligent. If a ball
is hit over this fence at a height of 9.5 feet, the owner should be held liable because his
negligence has caused the losses. However, if a ball is hit over the too low fence at a
height of 11 feet, the owner should not be liable, because also a fence of the correct
height (the lawful alternative) would not have stopped the ball. The negligence is no
csqn of the losses because without the negligence the losses would have occurred all the
same.
From an economic point of view, fault liability should be limited to the losses
that are caused by the negligence of the actor, because otherwise the actor will receive
excessive care incentives. An inefficient outcome will be reached (i) if the actor is
afraid that the court might underestimate his true level of care, thereby deeming him
negligent even though he took sufficient care, or (ii) if the court sets the due care level
higher than optimal without applying the theory of the lawful alternative. If the actor
is found negligent under these circumstances, he will be bound to compensate the
entire damage, including losses that are not caused by his negligent behaviour. In the
cricket example, the optimal height of the fence is 10 feet. If the injurer erects a fence
of 10 feet, but the court by mistake sets the due care level at 11 feet and does not apply
the theory of the lawful alternative, the injurer will be held liable for all balls flying
over the fence, irrespective of their height. Confronted with a large expected liability,
the injurer may choose to build a fence of 11 feet, which is excessively high. By
contrast, if the court applies the theory of the lawful alternative, the actor will choose
to build a fence of the optimal height of 10 feet. He will then become liable for balls
flying over between 10 feet (the efficient height) and 11 feet (the inefficient yet
required height). Because 10 feet is the optimal height, the additional costs of having
a fence of 11 feet exceed the expected liability when the fence is 10 feet high.
Therefore, incorporating the theory of the lawful alternative can prevent excessive
care incentives if the court by mistake sets the due care level too high. Of course, this
advantage should be weighed against the increase in administrative costs that it
causes.
2.4 Strict Liability
Article 5:101 of the Principles contains the following rule on strict liability: ‘A person
who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly liable for damage charac-
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teristic to the risk presented by the activity and resulting from it.’ Even though this
provision goes beyond the common denominator of national tort laws of EC Member
States and extends the scope of strict liability beyond the scope defined by specific
legislation, it is still very narrowly formulated.56 In the Law and Economics litera-
ture, several situations are distinguished in which strict liability is preferred. All
these activities cannot be qualified as ‘abnormally dangerous’, so that a broader rule
would be preferable.
First, strict liability is to be preferred in unilateral accident situations, where
only the injurer influences the accident risk.57 In such an accident setting, there is no
need to provide the victim with incentives to take care. Both fault and strict liability
may give correct care incentives to the injurer, but strict liability has a number of
advantages over fault liability. Care can be exercised in several dimensions. Fault
liability gives incentives to take care only in the dimensions that are incorporated in
the fault standard. Under strict liability, the injurer will take optimal care in all
dimensions that influence his expected liability. Furthermore, the administrative
costs will presumably be lower under strict liability, because there is no need to estab-
lish the actual care level of the injurer. Because there is less uncertainty over the
outcome of the individual case, there will be more settlements out of court that are
cheaper than lawsuits. A third advantage of strict liability in unilateral accident situ-
ations is that it leads to a more efficient activity level of the injurer, which brings us
to the second situation in which strict liability is superior to negligence.
Second, strict liability is to be preferred if it is important to give incentives to
the injurer for choosing an optimal activity level.58 An actor engages in an activity as
long as his costs are lower than the benefits he derives from the activity. He will only
choose an efficient activity level, if he compares his personal benefits to all costs,
including both his private costs and the costs he imposes on others. Under fault
liability, the injurer escapes liability by taking due care. Therefore, he disregards the
expected accident losses in taking a decision on the activity level. Because he is not
liable for engaging in additional dangerous activities as long as he exercises due care,
his activity level will be too high. Only strict liability provides incentives to the injurer
to compare his private benefits with all costs, leading to the choice of the efficient
activity level. In unilateral cases, this is an additional reason to prefer strict liability,
which is especially (but not exclusively) important if the injurer carries out an abnor-
mally dangerous activity. After all, expected losses can still be very high, even if due
care is taken. Therefore, reduction of these expected losses should also be aimed for
by reducing the activity level. In bilateral cases, where both the victim and the injurer
can influence the accident risk, a defence of contributory negligence is needed to
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provide the victim with the correct care incentives. The Law and Economics litera-
ture has made clear that it is impossible to give both actors correct activity incentives,
because only the actor that ultimately has to bear the expected accident losses will
make a correct weighing of his utility against the total costs of the activity. Therefore,
fault liability will lead to an efficient activity level of the victim (because he is the
residual risk bearer), and strict liability with a defence of contributory negligence
will induce an efficient activity level of the injurer. Hence, if it is more important to
control the activity level of the injurer (as is often argued with respect to traffic acci-
dents between car drivers and adult pedestrians), strict liability should be chosen.59
The third reason to prefer strict liability, although there is no abnormally
dangerous activity, is the situation where the injurer has better information
regarding accident risks and possible care measures than the victim and/or the
court.60 In these situations, fault liability would cause problems for the court to
establish a standard of conduct that is able to provide the correct care incentives.
Fault liability would also cause problems for the victim to prove that the injurer
behaved negligently. Strict liability does not suffer from these problems, because it is
up to the injurer to weigh the costs of care against the resulting reduction in expected
accident losses. His superior information enables him to make a better weighing than
the court or the victim could do. For example, a pharmaceutical company is presum-
ably better able to weigh the costs and benefits of additional testing of a new medicine
than the court.
The three situations described above (unilateral accidents, control of the
activity level of the injurer and superior information of the injurer) show that there
are several reasons favouring strict liability, independently from the abnormal
danger created by the activity. These additional reasons may explain strict liability for
non-dangerous activities in several European countries. It may be deplored that the
Principles do not include these reasons, since they seem to be shared (at least implic-
itly) by the tort laws of several European countries. Strict liability for animals
provides a good example to illustrate the above reasoning. Such a rule exists, among
other countries, in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.61
The preference for strict liability over fault liability can be explained by the desire to
limit the activity level of the owner, by the difficulty to incorporate all possible care
measures in the negligence rule, and by the fact that animals can cause losses in
unilateral situations. Of course, in bilateral situations there should be a defence of
contributory or comparative negligence, to avoid liability in cases where the victim
has provoked the animal.
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2.5 Damages
2.5.1 General Remarks
After the injurer has been found liable for the losses suffered by the victim, the
compensation to be paid must be calculated. The calculation of damages poses
several problems, including whether calculation should be done in a concrete or in an
abstract manner, whether damages should be a ‘lump sum’ or take the form of peri-
odical payments, which losses have to be compensated and which losses should
remain uncovered, and how to determine a suitable amount for non-pecuniary losses.
In the Law and Economics literature, it is well established that the injurer must fully
bear the consequences of the losses he has caused, in order to give him the correct
incentives to weigh the costs of precautionary measures against the harm that can be
prevented by taking these measures. 
According to the comparative report on the law of damages of the European Group
on Tort Law, almost all European countries follow the principle of restitutio ad inte-
grum.62 Consequently, to a large extent, Chapter 10 of the Principles, which deals
with the topic of damages, is in conformity with economic insights. Article 10:101
states that damages serve the aims of compensating the victim and preventing the
harm. Several provisions of Chapter 10 are consistent with the economic argument in
favour of full compensation. For example, Article 10:103 states that any benefits that
the injured party gains are to be taken into account when determining damages. This
rule avoids overcompensation, which could reduce the incentives of the victim to
take efficient care. Also the principal choice in favour of concrete determination of
damages, made in Article 10:201 of the Principles, fits the Law and Economics
approach, provided that the exception made for abstract determination is applied in
situations where this method provides a good approximation of the real damages. In
this way, the reduction in the costs of calculation of damages outweighs the small (if
any) errors in determining the amount of compensation to be paid. Material damage
to cars is an example of a situation where abstract determination of damages may
make economic sense. The costs of repair by a competent mechanic are a good assess-
ment of the true losses. The abstract method avoids the problem that the injurer
would not have to pay if the victim decides not to have his car repaired. Admittedly,
the victim who does not have his car repaired does receive an amount of money so
that he actually may gain from the accident. However, this only causes problems if a
potential victim actively tries to become involved in an accident. A defence of
comparative of contributory negligence solves this problem, because the victim will
receive no or incomplete compensation and will not gain from the accident after all.
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Other provisions in Chapter 10 are less consistent with Law and Economics
insights: the rules on damages for fatal accidents and reduction of damages will be
discussed below. We will also devote attention to the choice for proportional liability
made in Chapter 3 on causation.
2.5.2 Damages for Fatal Accidents
Article 10:202 (2) deals with damages for fatal accidents. Persons such as family
members whom the deceased maintained or would have maintained if death had not
occurred can claim damages to the extent of the loss of that support. From a Law and
Economics perspective, this amount of damages is too low to be able to reach the goal
of prevention, because the full losses are not incorporated in the calculation. The
damages are based on the loss of maintenance of the surviving relatives, but the loss
of life of the deceased himself is omitted. Yet, it can be safely assumed that the
deceased attached a positive value to his life, which is greater than the maintenance
costs of his relatives. Since this higher value is not compensated, Article 10:202 is
problematic, not only from a perspective of prevention but also from a compensation
point of view.
How should the value that the deceased attached to his life be calculated? This
is a very difficult problem to which the Law and Economics literature does not
provide a perfect answer. The suggested solution is the so-called ‘value of a statistical
life’ (VSL). In 2002, Viscusi and Aldy published an overview of more than 60 studies
regarding the VSL.63 This VSL is derived from all sorts of decisions taken by individ-
uals that influence their health and safety. Examples include buying a dangerous
product or choosing dangerous work. Such market choices contain implicit
trade–offs between money and risk, allowing for estimates regarding the size of the
VSL. For example, a person who buys an airbag for his car because it decreases the
risk of a fatal accident, values the decline in the accident probability higher than the
price of the airbag. This decision thus provides information regarding the value he
attaches to his life. By analyzing many of such decisions, one can derive a general
figure of the VSL. This VSL is not a universal constant or the correct price of a human
life. It is the trade-off that is found in a concrete investigation concerning a particular
risk, such as the relation between the height of the salary and the occupational
hazards. A VSL that is found in labour related research, therefore, cannot be simply
transplanted to a non-labour environment such as traffic accidents, because the
different populations have different risk preferences and attach different values to
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life-saving.64 Most American labour-related researches find a VSL between $3.8 and
$9.0 million. According to Sunstein, the VSL is currently set at about $6.1 million.65
Research regarding buying and using seatbelts, smoke detectors, bicycle helmets et
cetera show a comparable, but somewhat lower VSL.66 These estimates indicate that
damages for fatal accidents that are based on the maintenance by the deceased are too
low to provide compensation for sustained losses and to give the injurer incentives to
make a correct weighing between the costs of taking care and the benefits thereof.
Sunstein argues that the VSL is not a correct measure for cost-benefit-
analyses, and that one should use instead the value of a statistical life year (VSLY).
The life of a young person is ‘worth more’ than the life of an older person, in the sense
that more life years are saved. This implies that damages for fatal accidents should be
higher if the victim is younger. Article 10:202 can reach this outcome, provided that
the deceased maintained relatives, but the overall level of damages remains too low
because the loss of life of the deceased is not incorporated. In sum, Law and
Economics does not provide a perfect solution to the problem of calculating the value
of life but at least avoids that real losses are not compensated (as is the case in the
Principles), which results in under-deterrence and a too high level of accident costs.
2.5.3 Reduction of Damages
Article 10:401 states that ‘in an exceptional case, if in light of the financial situation
of the parties full compensation would be an oppressive burden to the defendant,
damages may be reduced.’ In doing so, the basis of liability, the scopes of protection
of the interest and the magnitude of the damage have to be taken into account. Given
the Law and Economics arguments in favour of full compensation, it will come as no
surprise that reduction of damages generally is regarded negatively, because it
reduces the incentives of the injurer to take efficient care and to choose an optimal
activity level. In the Principles, only limited justifications for reduction of damages
are given. It is especially noteworthy that no reference is made to the topic of insura-
bility, which is often invoked in discussions regarding reduction of damages. The line
of reasoning is that full liability would lead to uninsurability of certain activities, so
that reduction of damages is needed. In this respect, Van den Bergh and Faure argue
that it is not primarily the possible size of the losses that leads to uninsurability, but
rather uncertainty regarding the probability of losses and the danger of adverse selec-
tion. Limitation of liability does not solve the latter problems and provides inade-
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quate incentives to tortfeasors.67 In the Dutch Civil Code it is explicitly mentioned
that the reduction of damages should not extend beyond the amount for which the
injurer was insured or should have been insured. This provision reduces the scope for
reduction of damages, so that it scores better on the efficiency scale than the rule
adopted by the Principles. To keep the incentives for taking efficient care intact, the
duty to insure may be limited in real cases of uninsurability but the injurer should
remain liable for losses exceeding the insured amount.
In the Law and Economics literature, it is well established that the problems
of limiting liability are more severe in a setting of strict liability than in a setting of
negligence. The reason is that, under negligence, the injurer can avoid liability alto-
gether by taking due care, while under strict liability he can only reduce his expected
liability by taking more care. The financial reward for taking due care is therefore
greater under negligence, so that a reduction in damages leads less often to ineffi-
ciently low care levels.68 Unfortunately, many legal systems justify reduction of
damages especially in situations of strict liability, where the defendant can be liable
for large losses even if he was not at fault. From an efficiency point of view, this is
problematic since it creates incentives to reduce precautions below the level of effi-
cient care. The Principles do not explicitly mention strict liability as a factor that
could call for reduction of damages, although the ‘basis of liability’ is distinguished
as a relevant factor.
The Commentary provides two examples of situations that could call for reduc-
tion of damages.69 In the first example, a fourteen-year-old son of an unemployed
couple participates in a ski-camp organized by his school. When following his teacher
and other pupils on a rather steep slope, he loses control over his skis on a hard frozen
spot and crashes into a multibillionaire rock star. This rich victim suffers bruises in his
face and, as a consequence, cannot perform on a special gala for which he would have
earned ? 2 million. At first sight, this example indeed calls for reduction of damages.
However, on a closer look, a more careful analysis is warranted. It is very likely that
either the boy himself or his school will have bought an insurance policy, which (also)
covers liability for skiing accidents, or that his parents have a general liability insurance
that covers the liability of the son. If so, reduction is not called for. However, if we disre-
gard insurance, this extreme example might indeed call for reduction of damages. Full
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liability would probably not give more care incentives than incomplete liability,
provided that the injurer would still be liable for an amount of money that (i) he can pay
and (ii) that is large enough to make it more attractive for him to take due care. This
example introduces the question whether wealth of the parties involved should influ-
ence the magnitude of liability. Due to the concept of decreasing marginal utility of
wealth, it may very well be the case that ? 2 million for the multibillionaire rock star are
worth less in utility terms than e.g. ? 10.000 for the boy or his parents. Therefore, one
could argue that total welfare decreases dramatically by making the boy fully liable,
because his life and the lives of his parents will be financially ruined, while the rock star
does not suffer a large utility loss by not earning ? 2 million in the first place. However,
introducing wealth of parties into the analysis does not only influence the optimal
amount of compensation, which will be higher for wealthier defendants, but also the
optimal level of care, which is also higher for wealthier defendants.70 It is therefore
perfectly possible that the behaviour of the poor boy in the example should not be
regarded as negligent in the first place, so that the question how much damages he
should pay will not even be posed.
In the second example, due to economic growth in the region and rapidly
developing air traffic a local airport momentarily exceeds the level of noise allowed
under existing regulations. Many people may bring a claim for this violation of a
protective norm and the total amount of damages to be paid could force the airport
to close. This fear brings the authors of the Principles to the conclusion that reduc-
tion of damages may be called for. However, in the extreme case where the losses of
even a limited violation are so large that the airport indeed has to shut down, it seri-
ously must be questioned whether it is a desirable location for the airport. Closing
the airport may lead to an increase in welfare, if the local residents suffer real losses
and if exploiting the airport is only possible at the expense of the residents. In sum,
the arguments and examples in the Commentary in favour of reduction of damages
are not very strong. Only in extreme cases where full liability is not needed to provide
the correct incentives and where it would lead to devastating results, reduction of
damages is justifiable. Also the availability of liability insurance greatly limits the
scope for reduction of damages.
2.5.4 Proportional Liability
As we have already mentioned in section 2.2, the Principles adopt the concept of
proportional liability in cases where two or more events may or may not have caused
a loss (see Article 3:103). The justification is that a liable person has to compensate
the loss he may have caused, whereas he should not be liable for a loss that partially
is or may have been caused by others, the victim himself or natural events. The solu-
tion of the Principles is innovative and deviates from established rules of tort law in
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most EC Member States.71 Interestingly, a rule of proportional liability is in line with
the dominant view in the Law and Economics literature, according to which it
provides better care and activity incentives than an all–or–nothing solution.72 In the
previous sections it became clear that the injurer should face liability for all the losses
that he has caused, in order to give him incentives to take optimal care and to choose
an optimal activity level. If it is not certain that the injurer has made the losses
happen, but there is only a probability that he is the cause of the losses, full liability
leads to over–deterrence and no liability leads to under–deterrence.
An example may clarify the preference for a rule of proportional liability.
Suppose that on average in a population of 100,000 people, six people get a certain
disease. Now consider a city of 100,000 people, where a nuclear power plant is
located and where ten people become sick. Without further information, it may be
concluded that the plant, e.g. by emitting radiation or contaminated fumes has
caused four additional diseases. If it is not possible to distinguish between people who
contracted the disease due to natural factors or circumstances in their own risk
domain and people whose disease is caused by the factory, for every individual the
probability that his disease is caused by the factory equals 40 percent. An
all–or–nothing approach, according to which the factory is either held liable or not
bound to compensate the harm, will be inefficient. On the one hand, a rejection of
liability because the probability of causation does not exceed a certain threshold (e.g.
50 percent), will give the factory too little care incentives. On the other hand, if the
factory is made liable for all ten cases of the disease, it will have to compensate more
losses than it has caused. This will lead to excessive care and a too low activity level,
possibly even to withdrawing from the activity altogether. Furthermore, it may prove
to become difficult or even impossible to insure the activity, because it is problematic
to calculate a premium when liability also depends on the behaviour of other people
than the insured. Contrary to the problems of the all–or–nothing approach, propor-
tional liability will provide correct incentives. If the factory has to pay 40 percent of
the losses in all ten cases, the result is that it pays for four cases of the disease, which
is exactly the number of diseases that it has caused.
From the above, it follows that the choice for proportional liability is consis-
tent with arguments from the Law and Economics literature. Nevertheless, a number
of qualifications put the preference for proportional liability in perspective. The first,
obvious point is that with proportional liability, some victims receive too much
compensation (in the example the people that got sick due to natural factors) and
others receive too little (those who are hurt by the factory). This point is not relevant
for the incentives of the injurer to take care, but given the emphasis that the
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Principles put on compensation, it is noteworthy. Second, the factory only receives
the optimal incentives if all victims bring suit. If this is not the case, the factory
receives too little care incentives. Furthermore, the presented line of reasoning
assumes that the probability of causation is the same for all persons involved, while in
reality this probability may differ dramatically between persons. For example, the
probability that the factory has caused the losses can be higher for people living
nearby the factory than for persons living farther away. Also factors like age, gender,
lifestyle and heredity will have their influence. It is thus perfectly possible that for
some people the probability of causation is above the threshold and for others it is
below the threshold. Even with the all–or–nothing approach, the factory will still be
liable in some cases, so that the alleged problems of the threshold approach are less
severe in reality. Next, the possibility of proportional liability may create an incentive
to withdraw from certain activities if liability is based on a mere coincidental relation.
In the example above, the fact that ten diseases occur in the area where the power
plant is located in no way proves a causal relationship between the activity of the
factory and the higher number of diseases. In some areas there will be more cases
than average, in other areas there will be less than average. This is inherent to the
concept of averages and it would be wrong to base liability on such a coincidence.
Before a causal relation between the two variables can be assumed, it is necessary to
develop a theory that can explain the possible correlation. For example, a medical
theory may explain why radiation from a nuclear power plant leads to this type of
disease and statistical data may subsequently show an increased number of diseases
in the surroundings of a nuclear power plant. This could provide sufficient evidence
to accept a causal relationship; the mere increase in itself, however, is not enough.
3. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we took a critical look at the Principles of European Tort Law and
addressed two main questions. The first enquiry focused on the desirability of harmo-
nization of tort law, whereas the second question related to the intrinsic quality of the
Principles as a way to enhance the development of tort law in Europe.
The traditional arguments in favour of harmonization, such as market integra-
tion and increased legal certainty, were confronted with insights from the economic
analysis of harmonization of law. Attention was drawn to a number of important
advantages flowing from divergent tort laws: the possibility to satisfy divergent prefer-
ences across countries and learning processes. Social norms regarding desirable
behaviour may differ per country, implying that what can be termed reasonable care in
one country might be regarded as excessive care in another country. Also, different
interpretations of vague concepts of tort law and different choices to replace fault
liability by strict liability may generate important learning processes. Conversely, the
economic arguments in favour of harmonization of tort law are weak. Many torts do
not have trans–boundary effects, so that the need to internalize negative interstate
externalities effects is not a major concern of the harmonization process. Even if there
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are significant cross–border effects, it must first be investigated whether national
norms can lead to full internalization of the externalities. Also, the argument that
differences in tort law may lead to a ‘race for the bottom’ is not convincing in the field
of tort law. Finally, the size of transaction cost savings is small and the need to realize
a ‘level playing field’ for industry is a conceptually mistaken argument.
Even though the economic arguments in favour of diversity are stronger than
the economic arguments supporting harmonization, the work of the European
Group of Tort Law is a very important achievement for the future development of tort
law. However, it must be stressed that the Principles should not be forced upon the
legal orders of the Member States by way of a European Directive, which would
constitute an immediate ‘top down’ harmonization. Conversely, the Principles may
exert influence on national legislators and thus lay the basis for a ‘bottom up’ harmo-
nization, which can be achieved gradually and spontaneously over the next years. An
important instrument to enable such a harmonization is the development of a
common language and uniform concepts for the practice of tort law. Irrespective of
one’s view on the desirability of harmonization and the intrinsic quality of the drafted
rules, the common legal vocabulary can in any case be considered as an important
achievement of the Principles. Moreover, if the Principles are presented as a non-
compulsory system, leaving states the choice to either opt-in or opt-out, the benefits
of satisfying heterogeneous preferences and learning processes will be preserved. At
the same time, transaction cost savings may be achieved in fields where preferences
are homogeneous. If comparative lawyers succeed in showing that some differences
in legal rules across countries are merely of a technical nature and can be considered
as pointless incompatibilities, which do not touch upon or relate to differing prefer-
ences, then a harmonization approach of searching for a common denominator may
prove to be more successful than the ‘top down’ harmonization forced upon by way of
EC Regulations and Directives.
In the second part of our paper, we investigated whether the Principles lead to
an enhancement of tort law and an improvement of its quality, judged from a Law and
Economics perspective. We found that large parts of the Principles are in conformity
with economic insights: the elements of the fault standard, some of the rules on
causation and the concept of proportional liability. However, the harmony with the
economic analysis of tort law is not complete. According to Article 10:101 of the
Principles, damages serve the goal of compensation, but also the aim of preventing
harm. This suggests that the possible preventive function of tort law, which is
stressed in Law and Economics, is taken seriously. However, many elements of the
Principles turn out to be contradictory to Law and Economics recommendations. In
our paper, we discussed the most important points of difference. First, the limitation
of damages to normal losses, so that abnormally high losses need not be compen-
sated, provides the injurer with too little care incentives. Second, the Principles
contain a very narrowly defined rule on strict liability, which only concerns abnor-
mally dangerous activities. In the Law and Economics literature, several other
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reasons for introducing strict liability are distinguished, such as the activity level of
the injurer, the possible superior information of the injurer regarding accident risks
and possible care measures, and the fact that negligence gives the injurer care incen-
tives only in the dimensions that are incorporated in the due care standard whereas
strict liability provides incentives in all dimensions. Third, damages for fatal acci-
dents are determined by the loss of support of relatives, whereas an economic
approach advocates the Value of a Statistical Life. Finally, the choice for proportional
liability is consistent with arguments from the Law and Economics literature, but a
number of qualifications put this preference for proportional liability in perspective.
We do not claim that conformity with insights from the economic analysis of
tort law is the sole criterion to judge whether the Principles may lead to ‘better’ law.
The efficiency approach, focussing on deterrence and optimal loss spreading, may be
contrasted with a social justice approach, stressing the compensatory function of tort
law. Since goals of prevention and compensation are not always compatible with each
other, it is ultimately a political decision which approach will take the upper hand.
This brings us back to the first part of the paper, in which we emphasized that the
goals of tort law may reflect different preferences across EC Member States. From
this perspective, the inconsistencies with the economic analysis discussed in this
paper may be seen as a political compromise that should broaden the support for the
Principles as a basis of soft harmonization of tort law in Europe. In any case, hori-
zontal competition between national tort laws should be kept intact and Member
States should remain able to decide freely either to introduce (parts of) the Principles
in their legal system or to keep the existing tort rules unchanged.
542
View publication stats
